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Abstract 
This paper analysis various factors that influence electricity interconnector investments. It shows that 
several features linked to zonal market design, in particular the possibility to favour market 
participants in the own country compared to those in the neighbouring countries, distort the investment 
signals for interconnectors. Uncertainties on investments in both transmission and generation have a 
big influence in interconnector investment decisions.  
The paper proposes that flaws in market design, capacity calculation and capacity allocation need to be 
addressed to provide efficient signals for interconnector investments. It proposes to reduce price zone 
flaws by forming more natural price zones for Europe. Regarding asymmetry in cost and benefits of 
interconnector investments this paper proposes a two tier mechanism to rebalance the costs and 
benefits for the involved parties. 
Keywords 
Electricity transmission networks, investments 
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1. Introduction1 
It is generally recognised that it is possible to use social welfare as the main criterion for 
interconnector investments. Social welfare is often calculated through price arbitrage benefits. 
Security of supply and competition benefits of interconnector investments are part of the social 
welfare function even though they are seldom included in the social welfare calculation. Probably the 
reason for this is that estimating these other benefits is more difficult than estimating price arbitrage 
benefits.  
The costs and benefits of interconnector investments are influenced by many factors. This paper 
identifies the most important factors to be taken into account in interconnector investment decisions. 
In a network, each new investment affects existing investments which makes welfare calculations 
particularly complicated. In this paper influence of capacity calculation and allocation methods, 
factors linked to zonal pricing, tariffs and subsidy mechanisms, uncertainty and asymmetry between 
sharing of costs and benefits are explored. Finally, a mechanism to allocate costs and benefits in a way 
which promotes interconnector investments is proposed. 
2. Influence of capacity calculation 
Interconnection capacity calculation is a complicated matter. To agree on a bilateral Net Transfer 
Capacity (NTC)
2
 between two countries, only two TSOs are involved. If transmission capacities are 
defined regionally, the number of TSOs involved is already significant. 
One complication in the capacity calculation is the fact that interconnections are usually composed 
of several individual lines. The full thermal capacity of any line can only be used in special 
circumstances because of redundancy requirements.
3
 The N-1 rule requires that the network shall be 
able to face the breakdown of a single network element without supply interruption.  
Another complication in the capacity calculation is the inherent disconnection between commercial 
schedules and physical flows in the zonal price system. The maximum commercial schedules that can 
be allowed from network security point of view are calculated relying on simplified network models 
which treat interconnections as bilateral flow gates between price zones. A NTC value is calculated for 
each flow gate, this is the upper limit for a commercial schedule at that interconnection.  
The actual physical flow can differ radically from the commercial schedule, sometimes it is even in 
the opposite direction. This is due to the fact that each cross-border commercial schedule creates a 
whole pattern of physical flows spreading over several interconnections. This means that the capacity 
of those other interconnections will be affected as well even if one schedule appears commercially 
                                                     
1
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 ETSO, transfer capacity definitions, 2001; NTC, Net Transfer Capacity, is a bilateral cross-border capacity value 
indicating the maximal commercial flow between two countries. 
3
 DC lines can be loaded up to their full thermal capacity if the rest of the network can secure the breakdown of the line for 
example through redundancy in the AC network or through the reserve power arrangements at both ends of the line. This 
is important for the profitability of DC lines as the costs are relatively high. The situation becomes more complicated 
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only in one interconnection. Thus the NTC value of an interconnection is dependent on the NTC 
defined for other interconnections in the region. 
To catch the whole pattern of power flows spreading in a meshed network, a system of Power 
Transmission Distribution Factors (PTDF) has been developed. PTDFs indicate how a commercial 
flow will be spread between each possible path between the price zone of origin and the price zone of 
destination. This approach helps to analyse which combination of commercial flows is optimal, with 
the possibility to set the overall social welfare as the objective function.
4
  
3. Influence of capacity allocation 
Regarding capacity allocation, it is well known that the current methods used in many 
interconnections in Europe are not optimal even if there has been a lot of progress in recent years.
5
 
There are still many interconnections which only use explicit auctions instead of more efficient 
implicit auctions.
6
 There are still interconnections without intra-day capacity allocation even if this has 
been required by the European legislation from the beginning of 2008.
7
  
One of the main reasons why more efficient capacity allocation methods are not used is due to 
differences in national electricity markets. These differences make it difficult to apply methods which 
require a higher level of harmonisation. Another reason is the lack of liquid day-ahead spot markets 
necessary for implicit auctions.  
Figure 1 A tentative timetable for the day-ahead market coupling in Europe
8
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An advanced capacity allocation method called flow based capacity allocation has been developed by 
the TSOs.
9
 This method identifies critical network branches, independently whether they are at the 
borders of or within price zones, and uses the maximum flow allowed in these branches as the basis 
for managing the cross-border flows. With this method, capacity can be allocated more precisely and 
consequently the network can be used more efficiently without endangering the security of the 
network.
10
 
Flow-based capacity allocation with implicit auctions has been accepted as the target model for 
electricity cross-border trade.
11
 Figure 1 presents a time-table for implementing implicit auctions for 
day-ahead capacity allocation in Europe. Applying these methods will significantly improve the 
efficiency of interconnector utilisation as indicated by the reports of the European regulators, the 
French regulator Commission de Régulation d'Énergie (CRE) being the most active one in reporting 
on this topic.
12
 Reasons for inefficiencies listed by CRE are (i) difficulty to anticipate the market 
situation day-ahead to make explicit auctions efficient, (ii) market imperfections at both sides of the 
interconnection and (iii) mismatch of long term products with the hourly resolution of interconnection 
capacity. Another source of inefficiency is the uncertainty on the exact location of the electricity 
produced and consumed. Sub optimally, this gives the TSO an incentive to use a higher security 
margin in the capacity calculation and allocation phase than what would be necessary if the location of 
generation and load was known more precisely. Also strategic behaviour of trading companies in the 
way they use or withhold interconnection capacity can be a source of inefficiency.
13
  
Network capacity calculation poses an important question of transparency. European legislation 
requires TSOs to communicate bottlenecks in order to enable the market to better understand how the 
network behaves in different situations. However, only in rare cases bottlenecks, at the borders or 
inside the control area, are published and made so transparent that even another TSO could share the 
congestion analysis and confirm the results of capacity calculation.
14
 This means that for an external 
observer without access to network models it is practically impossible to make a meaningful analysis 
on congestion patterns and whether the TSO manages the network in a neutral and efficient way, 
following requirements of the EU legislation.  
4. Influence of the difference between the commercial and physical flows 
As explained above, in an electricity market using zonal pricing, differences between the commercial 
schedules and the physical flows are inevitable. Some differences are because of the network 
topology, others are because of a deliberate choice made by the TSOs on the commercial capacity 
value at each border. The freedom of choice for the TSO is particularly high if the cross-border 
capacity limits are due to congestion inside the national network. This is usually the case for large 
countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and Poland, but also applies to many smaller countries 
such as the Netherlands and Austria as well.  
An example of the use of this discretion on commercial capacities are the France – Italy and France 
– Switzerland interconnections in which the commercial capacity is set to a very high level on a 
common agreement between the countries involved. Another example is the Austria – Germany 
interconnection which is declared to have unlimited capacity. The German internal North – South 
flows are a further example of this discretion as there is no explicit limit to these flows even if they are 
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heavily using the networks of the neighbours.
15
 These unilateral or bilateral decisions by the TSOs 
create problems regarding an objective allocation of cross border capacity. There is usually no 
publicly available information which would enable to judge whether these unilateral or bilateral 
decisions can be justified based on underlying fundamentals. None of the above mentioned countries 
are transparent regarding the internal bottlenecks or the bottlenecks towards the partner country. 
There are several places in Europe where the difference between commercial and physical flows 
has a strong influence on transmission investments decisions, in particular when transporting 
electricity long distances. The most important transmission axis in Europe is from North to South and 
is used here as an example to illustrate this phenomenon.  
In the North-South axis, surplus electricity flows first from Norway and Sweden to South mainly 
through Denmark, partly using DC links. In Northern Germany this electricity joins the wind surplus 
electricity produced locally and in the North Sea. This combined surplus travels more than 1000 km to 
Southern Germany and Northern Italy using the Central European AC meshed network. The electricity 
flow uses all possible transmission paths, namely the direct path through Germany and Switzerland 
but also the side paths. In the West the side path goes through the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
and in the East through Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia. All 
these parallel transmission paths are under stress in high wind conditions. This is why all countries on 
the side paths of this North South dipole, except France, have complained about these parallel flows, 
often called loop flows. 
One important issue at the European scale related to these loop flows is that the method applied by 
the TSOs for congestion management does not yet take sufficiently into account the interregional 
commercial and physical flows. TSOs still apply bilateral NTC values allowing nominations of 
commercial capacity in a chain which potentially deviates considerably from the physical path used by 
this commercial flow. To improve the situation, a flow-based capacity allocation system has been 
developed but not yet applied in Europe.
16
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The difference between yearly average physical and commercial flows and the estimated monetary 
value of that difference in 2008 in Central Europe. A positive value of the difference, expressed in 
TWh, means that there has been more physical flows than commercial flows. The arrows indicate 
the prevailing direction of commercial flows.
17
  
If the commercial flow is higher than the physical flow, the country wins as the congestion rent is 
based on the commercial flow but the costs are based on the physical flow. If the physical flow is 
higher than the commercial flow, the country is on the losing side. Figure 2 illustrates the difference 
between commercial and physical flows in the interconnections in Central Europe in 2008. The 
estimated positive or negative monetary value of this difference for each interconnection based on the 
congestion rent at that interconnection is also shown. The sum of these differences is calculated for 
each country, taking into account half of the value at each interconnection, assuming that the benefit or 
loss is shared equally between the two countries. This is justified as the benefit or loss is realised as an 
increase or decrease in congestion rents which are usually shared equally between the two TSOs. 
In Figure 2 the influence of the North-South dipole is clearly visible.
18
 It seems also evident that 
the flows from North to South are over proportionally nominated through the Central Western Europe 
and under proportionally through the Central Easter Europe. This explains why France is the biggest 
winner regarding the difference between commercial and physical flows, the biggest loser being the 
Czech Republic together with other countries on the Eastern path. 
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 The value given in the picture indicates the yearly average net difference between physical and commercial (nominated) 
flows in 2008 and the estimated commercial value of the net difference (potential congestion rents not received or 
received in excess) based on the congestion rent collected at the same interconnection in 2008. For commercial and 
physical schedules data from Entsoe.net is used for the calculation. 
18
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The TSOs' data portal Entsoe.net contains for some countries information about the difference 
between commercial and physical flows. The way the information is presented is symptomatic 
regarding the importance of this issue. Ironically, instead of relaying the true picture of the situation as 
in Figure 2, the information is presented with such an aggregation that the difference between 
commercial and physical flows is practically not visible.  
The difference between commercial and physical flows and all uncertainties linked to this issue can 
seriously hamper cross-border investments. If an investment which would be beneficial for the 
European welfare does not benefit the investing country either through an increase of capacity at its 
own borders or through an increase of congestion rents, or through any other form of compensation 
such as increased inter-TSO compensation revenues, it is clear that there is little motivation for 
investing. In order to unblock the situation perhaps more innovative approaches are needed, including 
opening up transmission investments for other companies than TSOs. Economic theory has addressed 
similar issues, for example in papers on social cost by Coase.
19
  
This question of sharing of welfare and investment burden between countries is already acute and 
is becoming more and more important because of the investments needed for the integration of the 
increasing wind power in the European transmission system. The reaction of ČEPS, the Czech TSO, to 
the EWIS study is highly recommended reading for anybody interested in this topic.
20
 It illustrates in 
concrete terms what kind of national interest elements are at stake, both regarding sharing of costs 
between countries and regarding the influence of cross border flows on the need to limit the access of 
domestic generators and consumers to the network.  
5. Technical versus commercial solutions to the loop flow problem 
The uncertainty of the benefit for an individual TSO for its investment calls for a European approach 
in planning, financing, operating and sharing the costs and benefits of the common network. Figure 3 
gives a schematic example on how important co-ordination of investments is at the European scale. 
The picture illustrates the challenge of adding new lines in a meshed alternative current network with 
resemblance to the situation of the North – South dipole in which many countries are involved.  
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Figure 3 Options to increase capacity of a transmission path in a meshed AC network
21
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Figure 3 shows how the overall capacity is limited by the weakest line in the system. In Case 1, adding 
a new line to the system results in a relatively small increase in the overall commercial capacity as 
there is a weak line on the parallel path. This is because the maximum flow in the system is 
determined by how much electricity can be transported in a situation when the strongest line is not in 
operation. This is the consequence of applying the N-1 rule. To increase capacity from Case 1, it is 
efficient to upgrade the weak line as illustrated by Case 2a. The TSO can also invest instead in a phase 
shifter on the weakest line as in Case 2b. Phase shifter transformers are able to increase the impedance 
of lines, thus it deviates physical flows to the other parallel lines. Phase shifters can thus be efficient in 
alleviating the flow in one line but they tend to shift the problem to the other lines. In the example, the 
line upgrade, Case 2a, results in a higher overall capacity than when installing a phase shifter, Case 2b.  
Countries on the side paths of the North-South dipole have already taken action against loop flows. 
Belgium has invested in three phase-shifting transformers thus pushing part of the electricity back to 
Germany. Poland has refrained from reinforcing interconnectors with Germany as this would attract 
more loop flows and might further endanger the safe operation of the Polish grid. Instead, the Polish 
TSO will install a phase shifter at the existing interconnector with Germany. Slovenia has invested in a 
phase shifter at the Italian border and the Czech Republic has considered installing them.
 22
 
One idea to solve the North-South dipole issue is to bridge it with DC technology.
23
 This would 
indeed be interesting as DC solutions are capable of transporting big volumes long distances. 
However, for building a meshed DC network on top of an existing AC network some technical 
challenges still exist, such as development of a protection and control strategy for a combined AC and 
DC network and development of DC circuit breakers. If appropriate solutions to these challenges are 
found, using a DC overlay network seems to be a promising way to develop the European 
transmission system in the future.
24
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 It is assumed that all parallel lines have the same impedance and N-1 rule is respected. Individual capacities of the lines 
are thermal capacities. A phase-shifter is a transformer that can control the impedance of a transmission line when 
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There are also commercial solutions to the loop flow problem. The main solution is to influence the 
generation dispatch in such a way that loop flows are avoided. This would mean that some generators 
in Northern Germany will be turned off when the production from wind is high. To make this happen 
in a market based manner, Germany should probably be divided into several bidding zones along the 
North-South axis, with a limited capacity between zones. Even nodal pricing could be envisaged. The 
disadvantage of this commercial solution is that it would reduce the pressure on the TSOs to make 
optimal network investments. It would be a poor man's solution to survive day by day with a weak 
grid with potentially important welfare losses due to congestion. 
6. Influence of congestion management inside the control area 
If a TSO can guarantee free dispatch of generation and load in its control area, the control area forms a 
single price zone. In a single price zone every generator and load has the same market price. 
Historically, transmission networks have been stronger inside control areas than between control areas. 
This has led to a situation where most control areas form a single price zone. However, some price 
zones include several control areas. Germany has a single price zone in spite of four control areas. 
Additionally, Austria has declared to be part of the single price zone of Germany. The Czech Republic 
and Slovakia as well as the island of Ireland have also formed a common price zone, each of the zones 
including two control areas.  
If there are transmission constraints inside a control area, the TSO has three possibilities to act. 
Firstly, the TSO can redispatch generation, in some cases also load, to relieve congestion. This means 
that the TSO pays separately for some generators to produce more or to produce less, or analogously it 
pays some consumers to consume more or to consume less. The generators and loads to be 
redispatched need to be chosen in a way that the redispatch relieves congestion, more generation in the 
deficit areas and less generation in the surplus areas, for the load vice versa.  
As a second possibility, if redispatching is not enough, the TSO can split the control area into 
bidding zones. By defining how much electricity can flow between the newly created bidding zones, 
the TSO can manage the congestion exactly as described above for cross-border flows. Evidently, 
there will be a different price in each bidding zone when there is congestion between zones.  
Network constraints have already forced some countries to split the control area into several 
bidding zones. In Norway there are up to five bidding zones, Italy has six bidding zones and the UK 
two bidding zones, namely Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In Italy bidding zones are used to give 
geographically differentiated price signals only to generation units. For load, prices are averaged for 
the purposes of equal treatment of consumers and for facilitating the retail market. Thus Italy is a 
single price zone from the end consumer's point of view. A negative consequence of this price 
equalisation is that it does not provide incentives for the consumers in high price zones such as Sicily 
to attract power plant investments.
 25
 
As a third possibility for the TSO to relieve congestion inside the control area is to reduce cross-
border capacities offered to the market. It is worthwhile to note that EU law prohibits excessive 
limitation of cross-border capacity to defend the integrity of the price zone because limiting cross-
border capacity usually favours market players inside the price zone compared to the ones outside the 
zone. Limiting cross-border capacity is allowed for temporary actions needed for reasons of 
operational security or for actions which can be justified based on cost-effectiveness and minimisation 
                                                     
25
 Redispatching has been raised as a temporary solution for Sicily before a new line under the Messina strait has been built. 
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of negative impacts on the internal market in electricity.
26
 On this issue Danish consumers complained 
about the behaviour of the Swedish TSO claiming that the Swedish TSO Svenska Kraftnät 
discriminates Danish consumers by reducing cross-border capacity at the Swedish – Danish border.27 
The Swedish case was solved by the commitment of Svenska Kraftnät to introduce in Sweden four 
price zones in 2011, to use more redispatching before the price area splitting is effective and to solve 
the congestion in the longer term by investing in new transmission lines. Other similar cases have been 
raised in the context of infringements against Member States because of non-compliance with 
Regulation 1228/2003 on cross border trade of electricity and with congestion management 
guidelines.
28
 
The split into price zones does not mean that each price zone has always a different price than the 
other zones. In periods when there is no congestion the prices converge. Only when congestion 
appears, there is a price difference between zones. For example in the Nordic market there are price 
zones which share prices more than 90% of the time. 
It is not easy to evaluate in which cases it is still possible to keep a single price zone through 
redispatching and when a split into several bidding zones is necessary. Regarding redispatching, it is 
difficult to make a transparent system to optimally select the generators to be redispatched. 
Redispatching also invites the units which expect to be redispatched for gaming. Texas introduced 
nodal pricing partly because of the risk of gaming.
29
 Regarding price zone splitting, decisions on the 
limits of the zones may have distributional effects which could make it difficult to get the necessary 
political support for these decisions. The generators in the price zone with a lower price after the 
splitting will suffer as well as the consumers in the price zone with a higher price. Smaller price zones 
could also affect retail markets as an increase in market power could reduce competition and make risk 
hedging more difficult.
30
 
As price zone splitting decisions have radical consequences on the market, TSOs seem to use 
limiting cross-border capacity to avoid price zone splitting even if cross-border capacity limitation to 
manage internal bottlenecks is against the European rules. This limitation can significantly reduce the 
overall social welfare and in any case has important effects on distribution of welfare between the two 
countries involved. The Danish complaint against Svenska Kraftnät was mainly based on the 
important welfare loss for the Danish end consumers due to the limited cross-border capacity allocated 
by the Swedish TSO towards Denmark.
31
 
Another important factor is the timing of these measures. Price zone splitting is a structural 
measure which needs to be in place permanently or semi-permanently as applied in Norway. Cross-
border trade limitations can be decided in a more flexible manner, latest before the day ahead 
capacities are announced to the market. At that stage the uncertainty of generation and load schedules 
is still relatively high. Redispatching is planned and operated closer to real time when there is a much 
better view on congestion.  
Redispatching costs give an indication to what extent the network is supporting maintaining a 
single price zone. High redispatching costs would suggest that splitting into several bidding zones 
should be considered. Table 1 gives an estimate of redispatching costs in some control areas in 
Europe. It is very difficult to get comparable information on redispatching costs, thus Table 1 is not 
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complete and shall be considered as indicative only. The TSOs and regulators should work on 
publishing relevant information on this important topic. 
Table 1 Costs of redispatching in selected EU Member States
32
  
Control 
area 
Redispatch-
ing costs in 
year 2008 
[M€] 
Remarks 
Austria APG 24 M€
33
 Redispatching costs have decreased after 2008 due to 
completion of the 400kV ring in the East. 
 
Belgium 3.6 M€107 Phase shifters are important for keeping the cross-
border flows in control and to avoid internal 
bottlenecks. 
 
Finland 1 M€
34
 These costs are used for countertrading between 
Sweden and Finland, not for internal bottlenecks. 
 
France 40 M€107 RTE has a contract with EdF which allows decisions on 
dispatching of nuclear generation taking into account 
the network constraints. Redispatching is applied both 
to manage internal bottlenecks and to guarantee cross-
border capacity. 
 
Germany – 
sum of costs 
for all four 
TSOs 
45.6 M€107 
35
 The figure does not include the costs for redispatching 
in cases when the German legislation allows 
redispatching without compensation to redispatched 
units. 
 
 
Italy 
 
85 M€107 
 
These redispatching costs are used for redispatching 
inside Italy to guarantee the cross-border capacity at 
the Northern border. There are additional redispatching 
costs due to managing of internal bottlenecks in Italy. 
  
Sweden 4 M€
36
 Limiting cross border capacity at Southern 
interconnectors has been used to keep redispatching 
costs relatively low. 
 
UK 263 M£ (about 
300 M€)
37
 
263 M£ constraint costs in the financial year 2008 – 
2009. 
Investigating redispatching costs only does not give a reliable picture on whether bidding zones are 
appropriately defined because reducing cross-border capacities is a common way to reduce 
redispatching costs as explained above. For this reason, the amounts used for internal redispatching 
remain generally small and usually are only a fraction of the congestion rents collected from 
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interconnectors. TSOs do not generally provide information on what basis it is decided when to use 
redispatching and when cross-border trade is reduced.
38
 
If the critical network elements are inside the national network, there is often a wide set of possible 
commercial cross-border capacity combinations that are feasible. Thus the TSO can decide at which 
interconnection it limits the capacity. By analysing duration curves of available cross-border capacities 
one could get an idea how often the TSO limits cross-border capacity for congestion management 
purposes. 
If there are three short term solutions for a TSO to manage congestion discussed above, namely 
redispatching, splitting the price zone into bidding zones and limiting cross-border trade, the long term 
option is naturally to build more transmission capacity. The investment signal for infrastructure 
building for a TSO is dependent on which one of these three short term options is used. When using 
redispatching, the TSO could try to reduce redispatching costs by strengthening the transmission 
network at the internal bottleneck. When using curtailing cross-border capacity, there might be no 
incentive for the TSO to do anything if this limiting of cross-border trade increases congestion rents.
39
 
Splitting the control area into bidding zones will generate congestion rents from inside the control 
area. This could reduce interest in investing in the network. To put the choice of the congestion 
management method into perspective, the benefits or disadvantages of smaller bidding zones for the 
network operation is probably a far more important factor for the TSO than a possible increase or 
decrease in congestion rents. 
To achieve the necessary investments in the grid for a well-functioning market it is very important 
that the regulator gives the TSO proper incentives and does not focus only on limiting the costs and 
profits of the TSO.
40
 In general reducing congestion will require investments both within and at the 
borders of the price zone. Thus interconnector investment calculations need to take into account also 
the necessary internal transmission line investments. 
7. Locational signals and optimal size of price zones 
Zonal pricing gives an important signal for the investors where to locate generation plants. Zonal 
pricing promotes generation investments in high price zones. The system of zonal pricing has, 
however, an inherent flaw regarding locational signals. It will not use the transmission system as 
efficiently as a system with a finer geographical resolution such as nodal pricing. In the zonal system, 
generators close to the border of a neighbouring zone with a lower price are favoured as they get a 
higher price than they objectively should, seen their use of the transmission network. Similarly, 
generators close to the border of a high price neighbouring zone are disfavoured as they just get the 
price of their own zone.  
In large price zones this price zone flaw is more important than in small price zones. Large price 
zones are thus in conflict with the scarce nature of transmission capacity. This is true in particular if 
there is an important surplus of generation or load in some locations inside a large price zone, for 
example due to fuel resources or due to concentration of population or industry. Inside a single price 
zone neither generators nor an end consumer have an economic signal to behave according to the 
transmission constraints because all generators and consumers respond to the same market price.  
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It is generally considered that large price zones are more beneficial for retail competition than 
small zones, as there are more market players in a large zone. Small zones have usually less market 
players and require more effort in market surveillance. However, it has been proven that market power 
is linked to physical properties of the network and not to the size of the price zone.
41
 If a generator is 
necessary for the secure dispatch of the system because of network constraints, it can potentially abuse 
its position in spite of the existence of other generators in the same price zone. 
A single price zone is the preferred solution for many countries including big countries such as the 
UK, France and Germany. In these countries it has been considered as an important basic right for 
citizens that every generator and final consumer is equally treated independently of their geographical 
location in the country.  
Particular attention to this issue of lack of locational signals in big price zones has been given in 
Germany. The single price zone of Germany does not incentivise locating new generation investments 
to the generation deficit areas in the South but most investments are planned to be located in the 
Northern harbours where there is already a surplus due to wind generation.
42
 German market 
participants have been hesitant even to think about splitting the country into bidding zones as the 
outlook for competition in smaller zones allegedly would be worse than in the single German price 
zone. However, discussion on splitting Germany into bidding zones and on other methods such as 
nodal pricing has already started.
43
 The Central Western European regulators have agreed to make a 
regional study on optimal bidding zones. This study will probably constitute a real laboratory for 
analysing national and company interests, starting from the terms of reference, through input received 
from stakeholders, to interpreting the results. For example, concentrated interest groups such as 
generation companies or retailers might be better equipped than dispersed tariff payers for providing a 
good quality input for the study to achieve the result they prefer.
44
 
In some countries, instead of splitting the country into bidding zones, other locational signals are 
applied. The UK utilises grid access tariffs which are modulated based on demand and supply balance 
in each area, high access tariffs for generators in surplus areas and low, even negative tariffs in deficit 
areas, and vice versa for loads. Also Norway and Sweden have locational access tariffs. Norway even 
applies an hourly modulation of the losses component of the access charge. For Norway and Sweden 
these measures are additional to the bidding zone split. For Great Britain it remains to be seen whether 
network investments can be done fast enough so that the modulation of grid access tariff and 
redispatching will allow maintaining the single price zone in the future or whether a splitting of the 
single price into bidding zones becomes necessary. 
Locational connection and access tariffs are an interesting way to promote building generation and 
consumption units in places which are beneficial for the grid. There are, however, serious design 
issues linked to these locational tariffs, such as for how long time the tariff remains fixed, what 
happens if a new plant is built in the neighbourhood or how the tariff is changed when the flow 
patterns change. A volatile system of locational tariffs can be an important source of uncertainty for 
the investor. Locational tariffs can distort the market if they are applied locally without taking into 
account the need for European investment signals. 
Transmission network congestion will increasingly constrain dispatch in the future. Power flows 
from wind power including off shore wind generation in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea reserve a 
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growing share of network capacity. For this reason good locational signals for both short term dispatch 
decisions and long term investment decisions for locating new generation are very important. Thus in 
the future there will probably be smaller bidding zones in Europe and even a certain level of 
harmonisation of the size of these zones.  
To design price zones, at least five criteria should be used. Firstly the bidding zone borders need to 
align to the physical congestion points of the network. Secondly, one needs to take into account the 
existing bidding zones and the already decided changes to them such as the splitting of Sweden into 
four zones. This might not be in all cases ideal but defining price zones just based on technical 
parameters is not very realistic due to political considerations. Thirdly, the bidding zone split needs to 
take into account the extreme generation deficit areas such as Brittany and Bucharest where a separate 
bidding zone would attract more efficiently new power plants. Fourthly countries with important wind 
power development, namely Germany and the UK, need to be split into bidding zones perpendicularly 
to the direction of the wind power flow to allow a gradual, stepwise price increase from the wind 
surplus zone to the main consumption areas. Finally areas which potentially reach full price 
convergence independently of country borders should be merged into a single bidding zone.  
The author's view on future bidding zones in Europe applying these five basic criteria is presented 
in Figure 4. The design of these five price zones is based on the analysis on price convergence 
presented in another paper at Florence school of Regulation Working Paper series.
 45
 
A decision to split large price zones into several bidding zones fundamentally affects price 
formation inside the country creating high price and low price areas. This makes the decision highly 
political and is certainly subject to national and company interests. Generation companies are not keen 
to see their assets situated in bidding zones with potentially low prices, which could be the reason why 
vertically integrated TSOs are very hesitant to accept price zone splits. Decisions on bidding zones 
have also direct consequences on price formation in the neighbouring countries.  
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Figure 4 The author's proposal for future bidding zones in Europe
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Bidding zones for Europe 
1 Belgie & France du Nord 23 Magyar 
2 Bretagne 24 Mallorca 
3 Bucureşti 25 Malta 
4 Czech 26 Nederland 
5 Danmark Vest 27 Norge Mellan 
6 Deutschland Nord 28 Norge Nord 
7 Deutschland Ost & Śląsk 29 Norge Syd 
8 
Deutschland Süd, Alsace, Lorraine, 
Schweiz, Tyrol & Vorarlberg 
30 Österreich 
31 Polska centralna 
9 Deutschland West & Letzeburg 32 Portugal & Galicia 
10 Eesti, Latvija & Lietuva 33 Romania 
11 England Middle 34 Sardegna & Corse 
12 England North & Scotland 35 Sicilia 
13 England South 36 Slovenija 
14 España 37 Slovensko 
15 France Centre & Suisse 38 Suomi 
16 France Sud 39 Sverige Mellan 
17 Ireland 40 Sverige Norbotten 
18 Island 41 Sverige Nord 
19 Italia Centro Nord 42 Sverige Syd & Danmark Ost 
20 Italia Centro Sud 43 Ελλαδα  
21 Italia Nord, Svizzera & Cote d'Azur 44 Κύπρος 
22 Italia Sud 45 България 
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For example if Germany is split into several bidding zones, the Austrian price will align to the new 
Southern German price instead of today's pan-German price which will disappear. It is also probable 
that splitting Germany into bidding zones would oblige some of the neighbours to introduce bidding 
zones as well. Thus any decision to change price zone structure in a country should take into account 
the influence on other countries.  
Splitting Europe into smaller bidding zones does not mean that every bidding zone should have a 
very different price of electricity. Final consumers have usually contracts which are linked to 
electricity traded via long term financial products. These financial products are not directly following 
hourly spot prices but a longer term average of them. This means that even if in short periods there 
might be important price differences between bidding zones in a region, the long term average prices 
in these bidding zones can be close to each other. Thus, for the purposes of the financial products, 
Europe could be divided into much fewer geographical zones, for example into five zones as in Figure 
5 based on expected price convergence. 
Figure 5 
The author's proposal for future price index zones for long term trading of electricity in Europe 
Northern Electricity Price Index
NEPI
Central Electricity Price Index
ČEPI
Wind Electricity Price Index
WEPI
Iberian Electricity 
Price Index 
IEPI Southern Electricity Price Index
SEPI
 
Figure 5 proposes for each zone an electricity price index which serves as the reference price for the 
long term financial products. Such indexes already exist, namely the system price of Nord Pool Spot 
and the newly created ELIX price index by EEX. In bidding zones in which the spot price differs 
significantly from the reference price, this price difference can be taken into account in the contracts 
with the final consumer as an extra margin. In bidding zones close to the borders of the price index 
zones the price may correlate with two or more price indexes. In these cases hedging can be made by 
trading a mixture of long term financial products based on these indexes. 
An interesting price reference will be the Wind Electricity Price Index. The area covered by this 
index will have an important surplus production. This means that the price will be very low in windy 
periods and the price will align to the Central European level when there is no wind. This area will be 
a death zone for any fossil or nuclear generator, some gas fired power plants could survive paid by 
system service charges such as charges for balancing, reserve power and voltage control. 
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8. Nodal pricing as the solution 
Many experts consider nodal pricing to be the best system for taking transmission constraints into 
account in electricity markets.47 In nodal pricing the market price is calculated for every network 
node. In the case there is no congestion between two nodes, the price will be the same. If there is 
congestion, prices differ. The problem often mentioned in the context of nodal pricing is the fear of 
increasing possibilities for dominant players to manipulate the market. As many European price zones 
already have from a high to a very high market concentration level in the current zonal system, in a 
nodal system many nodes would have only one generation company connected. There is, however, 
evidence that nodal pricing would rather reduce the risk for market manipulation.48 It has also been 
questioned whether nodal prices provide a sufficiently stable signal for generation and transmission 
investments. 
As nodal pricing has not yet been thoroughly investigated in the European context, it is not proven 
that it would be worse regarding liquidity and market power than the current zonal system. In any 
case, nodal pricing should be kept on the agenda, in particular as transmission constraints seem to 
become worse in the future due to integration of wind power and due to increased difficulties to build 
new transmission assets. Wind power will cause more price volatility and congestion in the 
transmission network. Because of the short duration of extreme peak production situations, it is not 
thinkable that the transmission network is dimensioned to cover them without congestion. The 
inherent benefit of nodal pricing is to give efficient system operation signals which will be valuable in 
particular in these peak production situations. 
9. Challenges in welfare optimisation and distribution 
When welfare optimisation is fully utilised, this can lead to a situation where a high price country such 
as Italy will attract import flows to such an extent that most of the capacity of the European network is 
used for bringing electricity to Italy. A similar situation could appear with the wind power flows from 
the North occupying most of the European transmission network. Even if the overall social welfare 
would be maximised, this creates a distributional effect which could be felt unfair by countries which 
have to offer most of their network for the benefit of another country. For example in Belgium the 
import and export capacity is sometimes strongly reduced because of wind power flows. This can have 
a big negative impact on price formation and is not easily acceptable neither for the TSO, regulator, 
government nor the market participants. For this reason the Belgian regulator has claimed minimum 
guaranteed interconnection capacities for Belgium in the context of the CWE market coupling.49  
One way to alleviate this problem could be to distribute congestion rents using a more sophisticated 
method based on the contribution of each control area to the commercial flows.
50
 Currently congestion 
rents are shared in most cases fifty-fifty between the TSOs at each side of the interconnection. 
Deviations from this rule have been applied in the Nordic market
51
, in the former auctions from Poland 
and the Czech Republic to Germany
52
 and between Switzerland and Italy. 
53
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Moving to flow based capacity allocation will require a more refined method to allocate congestion 
rents. Methods have been proposed already and it is only a matter of agreeing between the TSOs and 
between the regulators on the distribution key.
54
 One proposed method is to distribute congestion rents 
according to the shadow price that flow based methods calculate for each interconnection. Simpler 
methods are also proposed, for example using physical or commercial flows in their relative or 
absolute form, comparing them to the NTC or to the thermal capacity.
55
 Perhaps an important 
precedent for congestion rent sharing will be the method used for the Central Western Europe flow 
based market coupling when it becomes operational. A method which uses as parameters the physical 
flows and capacities of interconnectors has been discussed.
56
 
Figure 6 The overall social welfare at maximum 
 
Distribution of congestion rents becomes even more complicated when large price zones are split into 
smaller bidding zones. The split into bidding zones has an influence on congestion rent accrual. For 
example, if Germany is split into several bidding zones and the prices in the Northern and Southern 
German zones align with the neighbouring markets, important congestion rents will be generated at 
the internal bottlenecks inside Germany. This might not be the optimal outcome for example for 
Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. 
10. Sharing of investment costs 
It is usual that both TSOs involved in an interconnector investment cover the costs in their own control 
area even if the costs and social welfare benefits for each TSO can be very different. The TSOs and 
the countries involved in an interconnector project will make their own assessment of the welfare 
gains. This might lead to a suboptimal investment pattern or to stop the project completely if there are 
not sufficient benefits for all parties involved. For any interconnector, in particular for subsea cables, 
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the cost can be attributed deviating from the fifty-fifty principle. For example in the case of the 
interconnector between Ireland and Wales, the Irish cover the whole investment cost. By sharing the 
costs proportionally according to the benefits, both TSOs can be incentivised to join the project. The 
usual fifty-fifty distribution of congestion rents could also be changed to balance the costs and 
benefits. This is not yet very common. 
11. ITC mechanism 
An Inter TSO Compensation (ITC) mechanism is provided by the European legislation57 to 
compensate countries through which electricity is transited. After a long debate, a simple method was 
adopted which compensates the network losses caused by transit flows and a reasonable share of the 
infrastructure costs. It was difficult to agree on many basic assumptions needed to establish the 
system, such as whether one can differentiate between a transit flow, supposed to pass through the 
country, and a pair of flows, one entering the country and another of the same size leaving it. It is 
common that the transit countries benefit from the transit flows through increased trading possibilities 
and through important congestion rents.  
The ITC mechanism yearly net compensation amounts ranged between 48 – 70 M€ in the period 
2002 – 2009 for the biggest net beneficiary Switzerland and between 48 – 75 M€ for the biggest net 
contributor France.
58
 Even if the compensation amounts in some cases can have an influence on the 
economics of an interconnector investment, they are far less important than the congestion rents. This 
means also that it is not conceivable in normal cases to get an interconnector investment paid through 
the income from the Inter TSO compensation scheme. 
In spite of the fact that the current ITC system might not be perfect and it will not solve the issue of 
financing future European investments, it gives certainty for making investment decisions. For 
example the decision of Skagerrak IV cable between Norway and Denmark was probably delayed 
until the increase of the ITC payments for Norway due to this investment was known. 
12. Choice of counterpart 
Even if interconnector investments are by definition bilateral investments, the influence of them 
spreads in a meshed network to a wide area. Sometimes there are options for choosing the most 
interesting counterpart. This is true for example regarding the cables from Norway. For Norway to sell 
electricity to Central Europe through Denmark leaves an important part of the added value in form of 
congestion rent to the Danish and German TSOs. By building a link directly to the Netherlands or to 
Germany, a much bigger congestion rent is captured by the Norwegian TSO. 
Until now the possibility to choose the counterpart has existed mainly for undersea cable projects. 
In the future this question might become very important when planning the transmission investments 
needed for wind integration. Transmission corridors will span through several countries and they will 
be expensive, perhaps using more and more DC technology. TSOs do not want to propose new lines 
through countries that would unduly profit from congestion rents without investing in a proportionate 
manner themselves. A caricature situation would be to build a European North-South link from 
Norway to Italy with Switzerland tolling the congestion rent, a situation that already exists today in the 
current AC network. 
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13. Third countries with different rules  
The European electricity system is subject to the EU legislation on the internal electricity market. 
There are, however, countries connected to the system which are not bound to this legislation. 
Switzerland is in the middle of the European transmission system as an important transit country, 
Russia and Ukraine export to the EU, Morocco mainly imports from the EU.  
Russia and Ukraine have maintained their export monopoly. An export monopoly can always sell 
at the EU market price as there is no competition on these exports. Switzerland is a rather similar case. 
For the transmission capacity towards Italy, which is the most lucrative export direction, Swiss supply 
companies retain most of the transmission rights. 
In all these cases companies receive monopoly rents from the exports. If there was competition for 
the export capacity, the TSOs would receive the price difference as congestion rents from the 
interconnection. Thus it is mainly in the interest of the monopoly exporter to invest in new 
transmission capacity, a situation existing for example for the merchant line projects between Italy and 
Switzerland. These projects try to capture the potential congestion rent into the developers’ pockets 
instead of these rents going as income to the regulated TSO.  
14. Regulated prices 
Price for electricity supply is not determined in all European countries through a market even it should 
be the case according to the European legislation. Many governments still maintain regulated prices in 
order to prevent the incumbent dominant player from increasing the prices to a politically 
unacceptable level. 
Figure 7 Vicious circle of regulated prices 
Regulated prices
No investmentPressure to prices
No marketGovernment acts
 
In most cases regulated prices create a negative incentive to build generation assets. The incumbent 
might be able to invest either invited by the government or hoping that it can influence the level of the 
regulated price and thus will be able to recover the investment costs in long term. For newcomers it is 
usually too risky to invest under these conditions.  
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Table 2 EU Member States applying regulated prices for electricity with the share of customers 
with regulated prices in each consumer group in 2010
59
  
 
Country 
House-
holds 
Small 
businesses 
Medium to 
large 
businesses 
Energy 
intensive 
industry 
Bulgaria 100% 100% 98%   
Croatia 100%       
Cyprus 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Denmark 94% 95% NA NA 
Estonia Derogation Derogation 100% 100% 
France  96% 83% 94% 82% 
Greece 100% 100% 100%   
Hungary  100% NA     
Ireland 80% 52% 28%   
Italy 91% 78%     
Latvia 99% 99%     
Lithuania 100% NA     
Netherlands 100% 100%     
Poland 100%       
Portugal  92% 88% 39% 62% 
Romania 100% NA NA   
Slovakia 100% 100%     
Spain  91%       
Legend 
   >95 % of customers have regulated prices 
   >50 % of customers have regulated prices 
   >10 % of customers have regulated prices 
NA  Information not available 
When there are regulated prices, the export or import price is in most cases not linked to the regulated 
price. However, the export potential of the incumbent is usually limited because of a supply obligation 
to domestic consumers which reserves in practise the incumbent's generation portfolio for its national 
customer portfolio. Only if there is surplus electricity, incumbents are free to export this surplus and 
they can profit from the higher prices in the neighbouring markets.  
Regulated prices easily lead to a vicious circle, see Figure 7. The only sustainable way to keep the 
price level low is to have sufficient electricity production capacity with reasonable costs. This 
situation is almost impossible to reach with government tendering or if a monopolistic market prevails. 
Regulated prices are generally prohibited by the European legislation, with some exceptions for 
household consumers.
60
  
In the Table 2 the share of regulated prices in various consumer groups is shown for the EU 
countries which still apply regulated prices for electricity. 
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Another potential distortion of electricity price is due to artificial distortion of fuel price, in 
particular of gas price. The price of gas can differ considerably between two neighbouring countries 
for example because of differences in gas market functioning or in fiscal treatment of gas. In these 
situations, instead of locating power plants close to the load, power plants are built where gas is at 
cheapest. This may require an electricity transmission line investment which would be avoided if 
artificial differences between countries in gas price were removed. Transporting gas is in most cases 
much cheaper than transporting electricity. 
15. Differences in transmission charges 
Network tariffs are in principle supposed to cover only network costs. In practise network tariffs are 
used for various policy goals. A recent paper from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by 
Sakhrani and Parsons is good reading in this respect.61 In many countries network charges are used 
for collecting funds for supporting renewables or simply for filling the state budget. This additional 
burden usually takes place in the national context but it has also a cross border dimension. For 
example high grid tariffs for generators in one country penalise the generation companies in that 
country compared to their competitors in countries with lower grid tariffs.  
There is a big difference between the European countries in the way transmission costs are covered 
through grid tariffs. Costs vary also considerably, in some countries customers pay a cost related to the 
historical book value of the assets, in some other countries the transmission grid has been sold to 
investors and the charges are aligned to how much the investor is allowed to benefit from the 
investment. 
One difference regarding transmission tariffs is how charges are split between consumers and 
producers. In Central Europe there is a tendency to have low or zero generation charges, network costs 
are mainly covered by consumers. Opposing to this, the UK, the Nordic countries and Romania have 
maintained a substantial charge for generators and they are allowed to keep these charges even if for 
the rest of Europe a much lower upper limit for generation charges has been agreed upon.
62
  
Difference in transmission charging is usually not an issue that affects interconnector economics. 
However, charging systems such as the past Triad-charging in the UK, based on winter peak 
conditions, could influence interconnector building as there is a risk for high charges to be paid by the 
interconnector. The UK is currently revising the transmission charging system.
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16. Cross-border fees 
Some countries still apply cross-border fees even if they are prohibited by the European legislation. 
For this reason cross-border fees are often dissimulated as something else. Cross-border fees are 
usually meant to protect the market rather than to cover the investment costs of an interconnector. 
Cross-border fees are common in particular in the new Member States, for example Bulgaria and 
Romania apply them.
64
 Existence of cross-border fees changes the economics of interconnector 
investments making them less attractive for the potential users. 
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17. Feed in systems and other forms of public support 
Capacity payments and other type of support schemes for power plants, providing a stream of 
revenues additional to the revenues from selling electricity in the market, can have an influence in 
interconnection capacity target setting. These payments and support schemes include a large variety of 
mechanisms such as payments to compensate availability of generation, feed in tariffs, top-up 
payments over the market price and direct investment subsidies. These payments are financed either 
through network tariffs, from separate electricity levies and taxes or directly from the state budget.  
Feed in tariffs and other forms of public support are a cornerstone to meet renewable electricity 
targets in Europe. They give investors a high level of certainty for the investment. There are several 
types of feed in tariffs accompanied with a varying level of priority regarding network access. The 
most important feed in systems from the transmission network point of view are the wind power feed 
in systems because the volumes are high and volatile and the transmission distance is often long. 
Support systems for wind power differ considerably depending on the country.  
Figure 8 Correlation of spot price and wind production as percentage of installed capacity in 
Germany in 2009
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As an example, the German feed in system obliges the TSOs to buy the wind power at the feed in 
price and sell it through the spot market. Wind power has a strong influence on the market price as 
shown in Figure 8. Before 2010, selling of the wind power was handled by the trading companies of 
the vertically integrated TSOs which was not a very transparent arrangement.  
The German market has seen low, even negative prices during high wind periods. This 
phenomenon is called the merit order effect as wind power production reduces the marginal price of 
the system by pushing more expensive plants out of merit.
66
 This effect is important regarding both 
interconnector and generation investments. In markets in which a high share of investments is 
financed through feed in tariffs or other types of public support such as capacity payments, the 
wholesale electricity price has less influence on investment decision and can be significantly lower 
than in the neighbouring markets. Thus the country on the other side of the interconnector has the 
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opportunity for getting cheap subsidised electricity by increasing interconnection capacity. This might, 
however, make its own generation investments non-profitable because of the cheap electricity 
imported from the neighbour.  
Even if the possibility to export and import subsidised electricity should increase economic 
efficiency, some level of harmonisation at the European level is needed on how investments are 
supported both for renewable and conventional power. Otherwise investment signals will become too 
varied creating an extra uncertainty for the investors. 
18. Influence of security of supply considerations 
The role of interconnectors regarding security of supply is not straightforward. In general 
interconnectors are beneficial for the secure operation of the network as a big system can better digest 
network incidents than a small system. However, if interconnectors are used to their limits, this can 
increase the risk for major disturbances as demonstrated by the black-out in Italy in 2003. For some 
countries interconnectors are vital for sufficient supply of electricity. Italy, the Netherlands and 
Finland are dependent on imports, at least for keeping the electricity price reasonable. Also Norway is 
dependent on imports in dry years. For small transit countries, namely Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia 
and Denmark, imports are necessary to counterbalance the volumes exported. 
Transmission investments are closely linked to generation investments. In a deficit area there is in 
principle always a choice between increasing cross-border capacity and building more generation 
capacity. Interconnectors have one major advantage compared to generation investments, namely the 
possibility to flow power to both directions. This allows using the complementarities of the generation 
systems at both ends of the interconnector. Connections inside the Nordic region, connections from the 
Nordic countries to Central Europe and connections from Germany to Switzerland and to Austria are 
largely exploiting these complementarities. The major disadvantage of interconnectors compared to 
generation investments is that they do not produce any electricity and thus do not improve security of 
supply in situations when all generation assets at both ends of the interconnector are already in use. 
For an exporting country, increasing interconnection capacity often means reducing security of 
supply at peak load as the neighbour could attract power in times of scarcity by just letting the market 
price increase. This might be felt unfair, in particular in countries which have introduced capacity 
payments to maintain sufficient generation capacity. Capacity payments are usually financed from 
transmission tariffs and are to be considered as a public intervention to ensure security of supply.  
In case the share of imports is high, the need to provide reserve power in the own control area 
might be an obstacle to further development of interconnectors. According to the TSO rules, each TSO 
needs to be able to ensure that sudden interruptions of transmission lines, including cross border lines, 
will not cause major disturbances. This question has been raised for example in the Netherlands
67
, in 
the aftermaths of the Italian black-out
68
 and in the context of the Finnish Government decision
69
 not to 
allow increasing the import capacity from Russia.  
There are past cases of using export restrictions in order to secure supply in the own country. Spain 
refused exports during the shortage of electricity in France in summer 2003. Similar cases of limiting 
exports exist also for example with France, Poland and Greece.  
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The fact that interconnectors could secure supply in the uncertain future also might play in favour 
of interconnector investments and not only stop them. Electricity is such an important good that no 
government can afford a major failure in securing electricity supply. 
19. Influence of the transmission investment itself 
An interconnection capacity increase changes the investment signals for any future investment at this 
interconnection.70 The obvious effect is the shift of the operation point in the parabolic congestion 
income curve. 71 This means that a new investment also affects the congestion rent accrual for the 
existing capacity. 
A new investment influences the prices on both sides of the interconnector. As the price in the 
higher price zone will decrease, there is a reduced incentive to invest in new generation capacity in 
this zone. In the lower price zone, on the contrary, prices increase and thus there is an increased 
incentive to invest in generation. Thus any addition of interconnection capacity will in longer term 
potentially cause a further imbalance of generation capacity between these two price zones. 
There is no natural end to the development of this generation imbalance if there is a permanent 
advantage in investing in one price zone compared to the other. This advantage can be for example 
due to the availability of fuel or other resources, possibility to build nuclear power or difference in 
taxes or subsidies. Only linking generation and transmission investment signals could create a system 
which drives investments to an overall optimum. A similar result could be achieved by the TSO 
making a global welfare optimisation calculation including both generation and transmission 
investments. Interconnection capacity would be dimensioned according to the global optimum, not 
only taking into account the costs and benefits of transmission. It is, however, questionable whether 
TSOs have sufficient competence regarding generation investments and whether it is appropriate that 
TSOs do this kind of calculations as the results potentially influence the market. 
European wide, no method, except the price zone concept itself, has been used to link generation 
and transmission investment signals across borders. Internally in some countries methods have been 
used for this purpose, the most advanced example being the system used in Great Britain where the 
modulated generation and load access tariffs have been reasonably successful in driving the location of 
power plants and transmission investments. However, investments in renewables seem to override this 
former system in Great Britain. For new plants the TSO will be obliged to give access to the 
transmission network with a "connect and manage" principle which guarantees income for the 
generator even if possibly needed wider network reinforcements are not ready when the generator is 
connected.
72
 
Some TSOs publish how much there is available capacity for connecting new power plants in each 
grid area.
73
 This could become a more important tool in the future to avoid unnecessary transmission 
investments. Preferred locations could be promoted for example with lower connection charges.
74
 This 
approach requires that the TSO is fully independent of any generation interests and that there is a full 
regulatory oversight in order to prevent discrimination between potential investors.
75
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20. Influence of opposition on transmission lines 
Transmission investments are often contested by the population living along the planned transmission 
path. This is perhaps the biggest obstacle to building new lines, and could be far more important than 
all the other influencing factors together. The gap between the current and the optimum level of 
transmission capacity might well be explained by the difficulties to overcome local opposition. Even if 
this issue is of utmost importance, this paper does not try to address it more in detail except to some 
extent in the empirical country by country analysis.  
Figure 9 Monster mast
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21. Influence of uncertainty 
Interconnector investments usually take several years before they are completed counting from the 
date of the planning decision. Investments also have a long lifetime, it is normal to consider 25 - 40 
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years when calculating the profitability of a transmission investment. Uncertainty can stop projects as 
the cost and benefit calculation for such long time periods has a high level of uncertainty.  
As the benefits of an interconnector are dependent on many influencing factors as explained above, 
there is a need to find pragmatic tools to appraise the overall soundness of an interconnector 
investment. One approach is to use today’s generation and grid model and market outcome as the 
starting point. However, because of the long lifetime of transmission investments, it is necessary to 
have forward looking tools including scenarios to calculate their profitability. It is usually possible to 
estimate rather accurately the costs and it is possible to have a rough idea of the price arbitrage 
benefits of an investment. However, many other influencing factors discussed in this paper are far 
more difficult to estimate. Thus the optimal capacity based on price arbitrage needs to be adjusted 
based on tacit knowledge taking into account these other factors. As the optimum is typically on a flat 
curve in this type of cases, an approach based on the TSOs setting the target for interconnection 
capacity for a reasonably long period, based on the combination of the best estimate of the welfare 
optimum by the TSOs and a judgement by the regulators using tacit knowledge, could be justified. 
Market participants including investors in generation would then have an improved certainty for their 
decisions.  
For this type of approach it is essential how the decision making regarding the target capacity level 
is organised. The TSOs do not have all the necessary knowledge themselves but they are dependent on 
the stakeholders. There are several ways how a consultation process could be organised to get the best 
out of the stakeholders' wisdom.
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22. Proposal for a mechanism to redistribute the costs and benefits between countries 
The discussion above concludes that distribution of social welfare is an important element to be taken 
into account in interconnector investments. The welfare effects depend on several parameters such as 
price elasticity and variability of the market price in the markets to be connected. The effect can be 
very different on each side of the border, for example the increase in overall welfare for one country 
can be much higher than for the other.  
As already discussed above, there are several ways to readjust the welfare distribution between two 
countries if needed. Currently each TSO covers the costs in its own territory and the congestion rents 
are shared fifty-fifty. This does not necessarily make the investment equally desirable for both sides. 
For bilateral cases rather simple solutions can be applied. Projects in which the benefits are spread 
regionally require a more sophisticated approach. 
Mechanisms to redistribute the costs and benefits between countries can be ex-ante or ex-post. An 
ex-ante mechanism is to adjust the share of project costs for each country in the investment phase. 
This approach is clear cut and efficient if the costs and benefits of the project can be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy. The approach is easy to apply if the main part of the investment is for example a 
DC undersea interconnector. The application is more difficult if one country would need to pay 
investments in another country. For the moment, within the EU, national tariff systems do not allow 
asset base investments in other countries. To address this challenge, a European transmission fee has 
been proposed for example by the Czech Government in order to finance investment needed for the 
European grid. Funds collected through this tariff could be used for example to finance projects in the 
Trans European Energy Networks framework instead of using the EU budget. In this way the amount 
of funds for these projects could be considerably increased. 
A result similar to readjusting cost allocation of individual projects can be achieved by agreeing on 
a package of projects involving several TSOs. In this case, instead of acting on participation in 
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individual projects, one would act on the overall costs and benefits of the package. The package 
should be constructed in a way that makes all parties involved reasonably satisfied with the overall 
result. 
One of the problems of any ex-ante mechanism to redistribute the costs of an investment is the high 
level of uncertainty linked to the calculation of benefits. As discussed earlier, a scenario based 
approach is necessary to estimate the benefits. Calculations for a long time period based on scenarios 
can be very sensitive for example to the conditions of investment in generation capacity in each of the 
interconnected countries, to changes in the policy and regulatory environment and to changes in fuel 
prices. 
Mechanisms to redistribute costs and benefits require negotiations between TSOs for each 
individual project or for the package of projects. Even if negotiations as such might be an efficient 
way to find a solution, there is a risk of abuse of dominant position by a TSO. TSOs being in a 
monopoly position in their territory, some of them could try to blackmail other TSOs to get inflated 
benefits in case they are indispensable for the project. For example transit countries potentially could 
use their geographical position for this purpose. Thus it is important that the process of redistributing 
the costs and benefits of an interconnector investment is transparent and there is proper regulatory 
oversight on it. The same risk of seeking over proportional benefits of course also exists at the level of 
regulators and governments.  
Continuous mechanisms, for example sharing congestion rents based on various welfare 
distribution parameters, allow readjusting the mechanism along the lifetime of the investment. The 
ITC mechanism is the currently existing continuous mechanism to redistribute costs and benefits of 
the electricity transmission system. It addresses network losses and a share of the past investment 
costs. The main weakness of the current ITC mechanism is that it does not provide sufficient 
incentives for new investments. 
When capacity allocation in a region is flow-based, a specific key is needed how to distribute the 
congestion rents. The distribution keys applied until now have not been published, there seems to be 
some mystery in how these keys are generated. This is probably because congestion rents are an 
important source of income at least for some TSOs. One problem in basing welfare benefit 
redistribution strongly on congestion rents is the volatility and the potential dependence of the TSOs 
on these rents. If there is a fear that congestion rents are declining and this possibility is not properly 
taken into account in the regulatory system applied, the motivation of the TSOs for investing might be 
seriously affected.  
Based on the above discussion, it is proposed that a two-tier system is developed to redistribute 
costs and benefits targeting in particular new investments. This system should have an ex-ante part 
which is applied for a project or a package of projects in order to readjust if needed the share of 
investment costs attributed to each TSO. The criteria shall be transparent and agreed between 
regulators. The system should have also an ex-post part which will further readjust the share of costs 
and benefits for each TSO after the investments have been made. This ex-post system can be a 
development of the current ITC system, but with a more global view of the costs and benefits than in 
the current system. It should address all the main items of cost and benefit distribution discussed 
above, such as sharing of commercial capacity and congestion rents, in addition to the items already 
addressed in the current system, namely network losses and infrastructure costs.  
However, it remains to be seen for how many projects it is really necessary. It might be that for a 
large majority of the projects the old principle that each TSO covers the costs in its own territory is 
sufficient. It is a well established principle, thus there needs to be good reasons to deviate from it. A 
more flexible mechanism to share costs and benefits might, instead of promoting investments, 
introduce in the negotiations arbitrary elements which potentially could delay agreeing on 
interconnector projects. 
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23. Conclusions 
This paper has discussed which factors influence electricity interconnector investments. It has shown 
that several features linked to zonal market design, in particular the possibility to favour market 
participants in the own country compared to those in the neighbouring countries, distort the investment 
signals for interconnectors. The problem of loop-flows is the most striking example of this. Other 
distortions are due to differences in tariff systems and existence of subsidies and regulated prices. 
Uncertainties of investments in both transmission and generation have a big influence in 
interconnector investment decisions. General opposition against overhead lines reduces the chance for 
investments getting realised. 
This paper makes a proposal to reduce flaws due to zonal market by forming more natural price 
zones for Europe. These zones should better follow underlying fundamentals such as generation 
surplus and deficit areas and physically congested borders instead of basing the zones in national 
borders. For asymmetry in cost and benefits this paper proposes a two tier mechanism in which an ex-
ante cost and benefit allocation would facilitate the investment decisions by making costs and benefits 
better balanced between parties, and an ex-post reallocation would reduce the uncertainty of future 
costs and benefits. 
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